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Mathematics and Pragmatic Naturalism
Abstract
In this paper we shall concentrate on the issue of those ways of knowing in mathematics 
that have traditionally been taken to support apriorism. We shall do it by critizing pragmatic 
naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics, and in particular its historical approach in 
denying any role to apriority in mathematical epistemology. The version of pragmatic natu­
ralism we shall be analyzing is Kitcher’s. In the paper we shall first set out a brief survey 
of the relevant features of Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics 















The pragmatic part of Kitcher’s  intriguing  theory claims  that mathematical 























about	the	conditions	under	which	an	individual	–	in	splendid	isolation	–	is justified in believing 





















Let us  start by  taking a  critical  look at  some of  the  reasons Kitcher offers 
for rejecting Platonism.2 If one postulates a Platonic domain of mathemati-




Plato,	 but	 its	most	 prominent	 formulation	 in	 the	 contemporary	 philosophy	
of mathematics  is  due  to Paul Benacerraf.3  It  can be  formulated briefly  in 
the	following	way:	if	the	causal	theory	of	knowledge	is	true	and	mathemati-

















Kitcher	 is	particularly	critical	of	 the	argument	according	 to	which	(at	 least	
some) mathematical results are self-evident and finds it most unsatisfactory 
since	it	implies	that	“mathematical	knowledge	can	be	completely	reconstruct-











Let	 us	 start	 from	 the	passage	 just	 quoted,	 stressing	 the	 role	 of	 tradition	 in	
mathematics.	When	talking	about	the	history	of	mathematics	there	are	how-
ever,	 results	 that	have	been	achieved	due	 to	 the	 independence	 from,	 rather	



















lems Platonism has  to  face. The  intention  is 
just	 to	 show	 that	 Kitcher’s	 methodological	








ico-mathematical’  is  used  to  include  the  so-
cial	and	historical	components	as	well,	apart	
from  the  more  obvious  philosophical  and 
mathematical  ones.  Many  controversies  in 
the	 history	 of	 mathematics	 were	 raised	 due	
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rejected for publication because “… about one hundred years too soon”)	or	
the	example	of	Ramanujan’s	who	was	in	his	early	period,	rich	with	results,	
quite	isolated	from	any	official	tradition;	the	living	Indian	tradition	was	ru-
















































the	 existence	of	mathematical	 intuitions.	But	 even	 if	we	assert	 (as	Kitcher	
does)	that	what	some	mathematicians	call	“intuition”	or	even	(in	the	case	of	
Ramanujan)	 the	 visitation	 of	 the	 goddess	 (Namakiri),	 can	 be	 explained	 as	
“fine-tuned	abilities	[…]	rooted	in	extant	mathematical	practice”	we	face	a	di-
lemma. If by ‘fine-tuned’ Kitcher just means perfect conformity to the extant 





Let	us	now	 focus	on	 the	epistemological	part	of	 the	pragmatic	naturalism,	
more	 precisely,	 on	 its	 central	 idea	 concerning	 justification	 of	 the	 acquired	
mathematical	beliefs.	The	core	of	this	appealing	and	provoking	view	(the	dy-
namic	picture,	as	Kitcher	named	it)	 in	nutshell	 is	 this:	 instead	of	 the	static 
picture of epistemology depicting a solitary individual justifying his findings 








der	which	an	individual	–	in	splendid	isolation	–	is justified in believing some 
hypothesis on the basis of some presumptive class of ‘evidence statements’.”	
(Kitcher,	2011,	p.	510)
Pointing	 out	 that	 the	 claim	 that	 “mathematicians	 prove	 theorems”	 is	 not	


















intended	 as	 normative,	 while	we	 are	 stress-
ing  out  exclusively  the  genetic  aspect  of  it. 
However,	what	Kitcher’s	 is	endorsing	 is	 the	
view	 that	 history	 has  to  be  the  teacher  of 









in	 accordance	with	 some	 “presumptive	 class	 of	 evidence	 statements”	 tries	
to	justify	his	beliefs	and	decisions.	According	to	him,	it	is	not	an	individual,	
the	solitary	thinker	who	has	to	justify	her	beliefs.	Justification	comes	partly	




































on the extensions of predicates which actually are satisfied by nothing at all but are approxi­
mately satisfied by operations we perform.”	(Kitcher,	1985,	p.	110)
He	endorses	the	notion	of	truth	that	nicely	fits	to	his	pragmatic	picture,	the	






bring	 about	 the	manifestation	 of	 underlying	 dispositional	 traits.”	 (Kitcher,	
SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA 
55–56	(1–2/2013)	pp.	(263–270)










correspond	 to	ontological	 structure	of	 the	world	 that	 is	 independent	of	our	
cognitive	ability.	On	the	other	hand,	the	notion	of	truth	Kitcher	endorses	does	
not	allow	mind-independent	truth	of	mathematical	statements.	Therefore,	two	
tendencies,	 pragmatic	 and	 realist	 ones,	 are	 in	 obvious	 tension	 and	 require	
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Matematika i pragmatički naturalizam
Sažetak
U ovome radu ćemo se koncentrirati na pitanje onih načina spoznaje u matematici za koje 
se tradicionalno smatralo da podržavaju apriorizam. To ćemo učiniti kritizirajući pragmatički 
naturalizam u filozofiji matematike, posebice njegov povijesni pristup u negiranju ikakve uloge 
apriorizma u matematičkoj epistemologiji. Verzija pragmatičkog naturalizma koju ćemo razma­
trati je Kitcherova. U radu ćemo prvo iznijeti sažeti pregled relevantnih obilježja Kitcherovog 
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Mathematik und pragmatischer Naturalismus
Zusammenfassung
Im vorliegenden Paper konzentrieren wir uns auf die Problematik jener Wege der Erkenntnis in­
nerhalb der Mathematik, denen traditionell Unterstützung des Apriorismus beigemessen wird. 
Wir verwirklichen dies, indem wir den pragmatischen Naturalismus in der Philosophie der Ma­
thematik kritisieren, namentlich dessen historische Herangehensweise bei der Verneinung jegli­
cher Rolle der Apriorität in der mathematischen Epistemologie. Die Version des pragmatischen 
Naturalismus, der wir auf den Grund gehen, ist die von Kitcher. In der Abhandlung machen 
wir erstens einen Streifzug durch die relevanten Wesenszüge von Kitchers pragmatischem Na­
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Mathématiques et naturalisme pragmatique
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous nous concentrerons sur la question des modes de la connaissance en 
mathématiques qui ont traditionnellement été considérés comme soutenant l’apriorisme. Nous 
le ferons en critiquant le naturalisme pragmatique dans la philosophie des mathématiques, no­
tamment son approche historique de la négation de tout rôle de l’apriorité dans l’épistémologie 
mathématique. La version du naturalisme pragmatique que nous analyserons est celle de Philip 
Kitcher. Dans l’article, nous présenterons d’abord un court examen des aspects pertinents du 
naturalisme pragmatique de Philip Kitcher dans la philosophie des mathématiques, puis indi­
querons les points qui suscitent notre désaccord.
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